Subject: RE: Video Request: Tom Cotton, Senate Armed Serevices Committee, 10am
From: "Yoxall, Collin" <[email-masked]>
To: Research_D <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 2 May 2016 08:49:46 -0700

REED (?): On behalf of the chairman, Senator Cotton, please.
COTTON: Thank you.
I know that Senator Donnelly asked about lessons learned from the F-35 program and what we might take forward in the other programs, given that some of the challenges of this program go back to some members' high school years.
I think we only got through Mr. Sullivan and Dr. Gilmore, though. I would like to hear the answer to that question from Secretary Kendall and General Bogdan.
KENDALL: I was thinking as my colleagues were answering -- I think it's a combination of things. But at the end of the day, having a successful program depends on a handful of things, but they're all difficult and complicated.
It starts with reasonable requirements. Then it has -- then you have to have professional management that is empowered to do its job. You have to have adequate resources. And you have to have a system that basically will support people doing the right thing.
In our system, as I think others mentioned, there is a very strong bias that's sort of built into our incentive structure towards optimism. It's easier to get a program funded if it costs less. People want everything faster and they want it cheaper, and they want it to be able to do more.
Most of the problems I've seen in acquisitions stem from being in a hurry and being convinced for whatever reason that things will be cheaper, better, faster than they will actually be, or that history would indicate that they would be.
My office was formed in 1986 because this problem was so pervasive. And I think we've had frankly a mixed record of success. One of the things that I hope I've done over the last several years is to put more realism and more -- to structure programs with a more highly likelihood of success.
A lot of the things we do, like F-35, are incredibly complicated and difficult. Development is inherently very risky. When you create something that's never been created before, and you do it with cutting-edge technology, that is -- that is a process that inherently has a lot of unknowns in it no matter how much risk reduction you do ahead of time.
So, I think support for sound management, ensuring that professionals are in place; resisting the tendency to spend the money just because it's in your budget and you're afraid you'll lose it if you don't spend it -- which I think is exactly what happened when we started production of the F-35, is something that has to be reinforced throughout the chain of command, starting with the secretary of defense.
COTTON: General Bogdan?
BOGDAN: Thank you, Senator.
I won't elaborate. The concurrency and the optimism piece are given. I'll give you two other things, sir.
When you set up a large acquisition program like this, you must ensure that the risk between industry and government is balanced appropriately. If the risk is all on the government or if the risk is all on industry, you will get bad behaviors from both sides.
So it is very, very important to make sure you have the incentive structures right and the risk balanced appropriately between the government and industry. We did not get that right at the early part of the F-35 program. Mr. Kendall, under his leadership, I have been trying to do that for a number of years now and it has proven to be helpful.
The second thing I would tell that people do not talk about much is leadership continuity. If you have a very large program and very complex, like the F-35, it will do you know good to put leaders in place that are there for only two or three years. It takes them a year just to understand what's going on.
I would tell you, our bigger acquisition programs need stable leadership at the top for many, many years, to help.
COTTON: Are you talking about uniformed leadership or civilian leadership?
BOGDAN: Either one, sir. They're both -- I believe government civilians and military personnel are both very capable acquisition leaders. You've just got to leave them there in place for enough time to make a difference.
COTTON: To the extent it's uniformed leadership, is that an acquisition challenge or is that a personnel challenge?
BOGDAN: It is both, sir. It is absolutely both. How do you provide the incentives for a military person to continue moving up in rank if you leave him in a job for five or six years? But that's sometimes what's necessary for very big, complex acquisition programs.
COTTON: I've heard from some of our partners overseas -- and I don't mean just partners in the Joint Strike Fighter, but our security partners generally when talking about acquiring certain weapons systems, that because they're small compared to the United States, they worry about being a plane with a country, rather than a country with a plane.
What's the risk that some of the partners in this program face in terms of the cost of this aircraft and the ability to acquire the number of aircraft needed to contribute meaningfully to the program?
I mean, how many -- how many Joint Strike Fighters need a country acquire to have a meaningful contribution to their defense?
BOGDAN: That's an interesting question, Senator. And I think it really goes to what each country cares about in terms of its resources and what they care to defend. What I will tell you is even our smallest nations on the F-35 program are looking at at least two squadrons of F-35s. And the idea that the partnership will be working together to sustain, maintain and train the airplanes is a huge deal for them because otherwise they could not afford a fifth-generation capability like they are today.
COTTON: Thank you.

From: Yoxall, Collin
Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2016 11:42 AM
To: Research_D
Subject: RE: Video Request: Tom Cotton, Senate Armed Serevices Committee, 10am

Committee is in recess but Cotton has already done his questions. No flags

Witnesses:
Under Sec Frank Kendall
Director Michael Gilmore
Lt Gen Christopher Bogdan
Director Michael Sullivan

Cotton: Sen Donnelly asked about lessons learned w/f35. Would like to hear from Kendall and Bogdan.
Kendall: a combination of things. Starts w/ reasonable reqs, good management, adq. resources, and incentives to do the right thing. Right now we have a system that rewards optimism. Most of the issues I've seen have had to do w/people wanting things too fast and wanting things to do more. I've tried to put more reason into the office.
Bogdan: First, When you set up large acqusition you have to balance between industry and government. If not, you will get bad behavior. We didn't get that right when we started out. Second, we need leadership continuity. It takes a year to know what is going on.
Cotton: uniformed or civilian leadership?
Bogdan: both. But they have they have to be in place.
Cotton: With uniformed personnel is that an acquisition or manpower issue?
Bogdan: both sir.

Cotton: have heard from overseas partners that they worry about being "a plane with a country" not a "country with a plane". What is the risk partners RE: cost and planes sent to partners? How many JSFs need a country get to have meaningful contribution to defense?
Bogdan: it comes down to what country and its resources. Our smallest partners are looking at 2 squadrons. Without this collaboration, smaller countries could not afford a 5th Gen fighter.

Cotton: thank you.

From: Yoxall, Collin
Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2016 9:55 AM
To: Research_D
Subject: Video Request: Tom Cotton, Senate Armed Serevices Committee, 10am

On the F-35.

http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/16-04-26-f-35-joint-strike-fighter-program-

Collin Yoxall
Research Associate, DNC
Office: 202-863-8126 X8126
Mobile: 334-703-1690
[email-masked]<mailto:[email-masked]>