Subject: (Political Risk!!!) Focus on the meat and two veg of reform - Howard Davies - FT
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Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2010 10:52:33 -0400

Focus on the meat and two veg of reform
By Howard Davies
Published: August 31 2010 22:04 | Last updated: August 31 2010 22:04
The French take over the leadership of the Group of 20 this autumn, a  
prospect that must be exciting Downing Street and the White House  
already. Last week Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s president, set out his  
priorities, initially to a complaisant audience of French ambassadors  
in the safe environs of the Quai d’Orsay.

He proposes to be an activist chairman. Who could have imagined  
otherwise? France’s leadership will be energetic and effective. In  
particular, it will promote fundamental reform of the international  
monetary system, a theme Mr Sarkozy broached in his address to the  
World Economic Forum in Davos in January. Instability in financial  
markets, he argued, “is a threat to world growth”, adding: “We need  
new instruments to prevent excessive currency volatility.” What the  
full range of those instruments might be was not set out, but he did  
call for a new reserve currency “not issued by one country alone”.

There are the germs, here, of yet another narrative explaining the  
financial crisis and its aftermath. Mr Sarkozy has already been  
fertile in his explanations. Initially, we may recall, the French  
focused on hedge funds and on offshore centres, known more colourfully  
in French as “fiscal paradises”. In the run-up to the London G20 last  
year, indeed, Mr Sarkozy insisted on measures to clamp down on them –  
threatening not to show up at all if Gordon Brown, Britain’s then  
prime minister, did not concede the point. We hear little of those  
concerns now: the caravan has moved on.

Indeed, it is striking how, fully three years after the crisis began,  
we are still no nearer to a consensus about the underlying causes and  
the most effective remedies. Normally, when a disaster strikes,  
whether man-made or natural, we begin with a range of theories, some  
less plausible than others. Then, as more is learnt, we tend to  
converge on one, or perhaps a small number of competing explanations.  
This time, the old saw that success has a hundred fathers but failure  
is an orphan has been turned on its head.

Far from opinion converging on one theory, views have tended to  
diverge, with a range of competing narratives articulated, from the  
grand macro explanations focusing on global imbalances, loose monetary  
policy and the savings glut, through regulatory failings – too little  
capital, feckless supervisors, gaps in oversight in the US – to a  
whole series centred on the outrageous behaviour of banks themselves,  
fuelled by greed and dangerous incentives. I have catalogued 38  
distinct theories in a new book, The Financial Crisis: Who is to Blame?

Politicians have become more attracted by the wicked bankers line as  
time has passed and elections have had to be surmounted. But now it is  
the dollar, the International Monetary Fund and the currency markets  
that are coming under the spotlight, as underlying factors which  
contributed to the crisis. The American (and British) belief in pure  
currency floats, broadly supported by the IMF, is seen as creating the  
conditions for “excess” volatility. These are, of course, long-held  
concerns in Paris, where the role of the dollar in international  
markets is widely resented and part of the attraction of the euro was  
its potential role as a “competing” reserve currency, so perhaps we  
may count this new narrative as one that slots under “never waste a  
good crisis”.

Does this lack of consensus matter? Maybe we should welcome a  
comprehensive overhaul of the financial and monetary system, even of  
those parts that can hardly be blamed for the meltdown. Perhaps, but  
the risk is that the G20 gets bogged down in a morass of initiatives.  
Already the initial sharp focus on remedial measures evident at the  
London summit last year has dissipated, and different countries have  
focused on domestic reform programmes that have little to do with each  
other and which will not make international co-ordination easier in  
future. The Dodd-Frank debates over US financial reform proceeded with  
almost no discussion of the global dimension of securities markets.  
The recently announced UK plan to carve the Financial Services  
Authority into four pieces, whatever its internal merits, will make it  
harder for British regulators to play their part in international  
forums, as their structure will not match those of other countries.  
European parliament proposals on pay sit uneasily with reforms already  
agreed under the auspices of the Financial Stability Board.

A better approach for the G20 over the next year would be to give the  
Federation of Small Businesses the job of producing its own summary of  
the principal malfunctions in financial markets in 2007-09, together  
with an assessment of how far the reforms we have seen already offer  
the prospect of correcting those malfunctions. I suspect that exercise  
would produce a different agenda from the one sketched out by Mr  
Sarkozy last week. There is still much work to do on the capital  
framework for banks and brokers, there is an unfinished agenda in the  
derivatives markets, and the thorny issues surrounding cross-border  
insolvencies need resolution.

Grappling with these tough technical questions, which do need  
political focus to overcome national resistance, is not such a  
glamorous menu for world leaders. The meat and two veg of bankruptcy  
arrangements is less appealing than the foie gras and soufflés of  
international monetary reform, but more nourishing in the longer term.

The writer is director of the London School of Economics and a former  
chairman of the FSA. His latest book is The Financial Crisis: Who is  
to Blame?