Subject: MENA and Elite Dynamics (Please hold these close)
From: "Michael Andrews" <[email-masked]>
To: "Hunter Biden" <[email-masked]>, "Eric Schwerin" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2011 12:10:00 -0400

Hunter and Eric,

I thought you might find these two short papers useful. We have sent this note below out to a few people including SWFs.  The first paper below describes elite dynamics and the second was how we looked at the problems in the Middle East and North Africa.

Over the years, our group has been looking at the world through a series of questions (and products) driven by our customers' pressing problems:  What is Country A doing? How robust is the weapons technology program in country B? What is driving political processes in Country C?  How should we think about Country D? Beyond our customers’ requests, we explore more varied topics such as: the elite forces behind the ouster of Egypt’s president; the consequences of unrest in Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, etc.; and the likely stability of KSA. We examine how Iran is fueling groups in Lebanon, Gaza, and elsewhere. We analyze how Russia, China, and other “big” players are in involved in various regions and issues. Our understanding, at this point, is that the situation in the Middle East is irreversible, and, as the recent demonstrations in Malaysia indicate, the resonance from one more major "shock" may ignite rather sudden, unexpected eruptions in places long politically moribund. Thus the possibility of unrest exists in many nations.

Enclosed herein are some thoughts on what may lurk below the surface of the regional and, indeed, global instability.

Since February, we have been building an "emergent" elite mapping for various countries in the ME now experiencing unrest. This mapping tracks the political power trajectories of a large number of elite entities, groups, coalitions, clusters, and parties as they emerge. Elites in this analysis are likely to number in the tens of thousands. This is all tied to the notion of the "circulation of elites," a concept originating with Pareto and Mosca in the early 1900s (See Alfredo Pareto, The Rise and Fall of the Elites, (NJ: The Bedminister Press, 1968). Pareto wrote this in the early 1900s). The circulation of elites measures the rigidity in elite structures and the potential for massive instability.

Yet understanding why long anticipated regional uprisings and protests are happening now is difficult. Why do they appear impervious to suppression? The uprisings are, on the one hand, disconnected and idiosyncratic, and on the other hand similar and loosely coupled. Cell phones and Facebook are not concrete explanations. There was no Facebook in the May/June 1968 Paris Revolt that ushered in a wave of protests and labor unrest in Europe. Globalization and the accompanying social and geographical mobility of labor have in the past provided a reliable and sustained release valve for the educated and skilled youth in the Middle East. The population flowed back and forth through chain migration into the Gulf, Asia, Europe, and even North America. However the punishing global financial crisis and sustained recession have limited opportunities for the youth. This is an old story: a young, skilled generation unable to migrate to profitable jobs in Europe and the West grows frustrated and now connects to regional colleagues with the same circumstances.

In addition, these groups are easily mobilized for purposeful ends, which raises questions such as: Do the protests have tentacles into traditional opposition groups, intelligence services, militant groups, or other regional entities? We suspect that groups such as AQ and its affiliates have yet to be heard, but they are there. These uprisings are far from over. And where they might spread is unclear at this time.

I'd be happy to discuss this memo at your earliest convenience.

All the best,