Subject: NDI Algeria Assessment
From: "Ken Wollack" <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2017 12:02:37 -0500

I wanted to forward the following independent evaluation of NDI's program
in Algeria funded by the State Department's Middle East Partnership
Initiative (MEPI).  While the evaluation does not overlook aspects of the
program that did not produce results, due to circumstances beyond NDI's
control, the evaluator goes into great detail about the achievements of our
efforts with women, using both quantitative and qualitative methods.

With best regards,

Ken

Kenneth Wollack
President
National Democratic Institute
455 Massachusetts Ave., NW, 8th Floor
Washington, DC 20001
202-728-5500 (Tel)
888-875-2887 (Fax)
email: [email-masked]
website: www.ndi.org

Algeria, D.C.-managed grant: Enhancing Women’s Political Engagement and
Citizen Oversight Background

*Country background*

Algeria is not an electoral democracy, and the country is rated as “not
free” by Freedom House. The 2014 presidential election was criticized as
fraudulent, and it returned ailing President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to a
fourth term. While the executive controls the main levers of power, the
2012 elections to the relatively weak lower house of parliament were viewed
as the freest and fairest in years,[1] 23 new parties were registered, and
a 2011 law established a quota that ensured that one-third of MPs were
women. Elected officials at the regional and municipal levels say that they
are largely free to address local concerns without government interference.

Algerians in interviews and in print say that their country had “its Arab
Spring” in 1988, when demonstrations led to free elections in 1990 and 1991
that were won by Islamists. The new political reality led to a reactionary
military coup in 1992 that resulted in 200,000 deaths during a 10-year
civil war known as the “black decade.” [2] With memories of that
instability still fresh, Algeria was largely unaffected by the 2011 Arab
Spring, in part because of high oil prices that helped the government
provide subsidies and fund social programs.[3]

*Program background*

The Enhancing Women’s Political Engagement and Citizen Oversight program,
implemented by the National Democratic Institute, is a four-year, $2.7
million cooperative agreement that ended December 31, 2016. The project
initially trained newly-elected women members of Parliament, but NDI has
since shifted its focus to women elected officials from regional and
municipal councils. That component also provides technical support for
coalition building and advocacy efforts, in partnership with women’s CSOs.

A second component provided technical assistance to the Observatoire de la
Société Civile pour l’Observation des Elections (Observatory), a coalition
of more than 25 CSOs set up to conduct domestic monitoring of the 2014
presidential election. This effort was based on the success of a similar
effort for the 2012 parliamentary elections. NDI is also conducting a
political party-strengthening program with funding from the United
Kingdom.

Findings

*Question 1: Programmatic objectives*

The NDI project began in September 2012 with the goals of supporting women
elected officials to become more effective representatives; improving
coordination between those officials and CSOs; and promoting and training a
domestic monitoring coalition for the 2014 presidential election. Work on
the first goal began with women elected to the lower house of the national
parliament, and expanded over time to include women serving on the councils
of the 48 provinces (*wilayas*) and of municipalities. NDI was able to use
its connections with political parties to reach elected women interested in
the program.

The most notable results from the program with women officials were the
creation of a women’s caucus in parliament (which is creating a nationwide
network of elected women at all levels) and the amendment of several pieces
of legislation, including, child support, the rights of divorced women, and
combatting violence against women. The women involved in those efforts
credited NDI with giving them the confidence, skills and knowledge to
analyze legislation, modify bills, advocate their positions in the mass
media, and hold productive meetings with constituents. One local official
said that the training not only helped her become more effective, but also
advanced her political career, saying, “To indicate on my CV that I have
participated in NDI’s programs is very impactful.” A CSO activist who
worked with the program pointed out that the law on violence against women
had been 15 years in the making. She noted that lobbying the government is
more effective than lobbying parliament, because the government has the
exclusive right of legislative initiative; i.e., only the government can
introduce a bill in parliament, which individual members of parliament
cannot do.

At the local level, participants stated that they used their training to
implement specific initiatives. For example, a municipal councilor
described how she used her new knowledge of the municipal budget to develop
a home health care plan that will purchase vehicles and medical kits to
enable doctors to visit elderly patients in their homes. Another described
how she used her budget training to develop an initiative to develop
solutions to parking problems in her community, and a third described
provincial school construction and adult literacy projects. NDI officials
said that this activity allowed them to work outside of Algiers in 13 of
the 48 provinces.

As of the June 2016 quarterly report, the latest available during the data
collection period, NDI was on track to reach its results and fulfill its
activity plan in its work with women elected officials and CSOs. A total of
386 participants demonstrated improvement in their functions as
representatives, exceeding the target of 350. Total attendance at NDI
events was 484, exceeding the target of 200. Quantitative measures like
this are an adequate measure of the implementer’s level of activity and
effectiveness. A MEPI official said that there has been noticeable
improvement in the quality of legislation.

Participants interviewed by the evaluation team praised NDI trainers,
particularly training on legislative procedure with a former Canadian MP
and minister and a Malaysian MP. Five MPs specifically cited programs with
foreign trainers or study visits as particularly useful to them, with
several calling for more exchange visits. “The former Canadian minister was
magnificent. She helped us improve our ability to study bills,” said one
MP. Another MP said, “The most important, the best, was exchanging
experiences with a Canadian MP. We learned how to persuade other MPs, the
tools that are used.”

While most beneficiaries were grateful for interaction with women from
established democracies, two women said foreigners were unfamiliar with the
country and not as effective. “The trainer had come from Canada; the
content was very far from Algerian reality. It was not beneficial,” said
one MP. A provincial assembly member said, “The shortcomings of the
programs is that trainers usually come from abroad, and they are not well
informed about our country, and that means that sometimes there is a gap or
mismatch between the content of the training and the reality in our
country.”

Another effective activity was a series of evening discussions during
Ramadan that brought together elected officials and CSO representatives for
an open discussion. CSO officials were also used as trainers; the
Information and Documentation Center for Children’s and Women’s Rights,
known by its French acronym CIDDEF, conducted a regular training series.
NDI reached its target of five CSOs that could point to policy changes
thanks to their advocacy, an indicator that measures the activity of CSOs,
rather than the extent of their impact. CSO representatives who were
interviewed all pointed to the legislation on child support, the rights of
divorced women, and combatting violence against women as the greatest
impact from their participation.

The election observation component proved less successful. While NDI
organized a study mission to Jordan in January 2013 and began training
observers in February 2013, the observation component ultimately collapsed
due to political differences. At the time, President Bouteflika was in poor
health following a stroke and seeking treatment outside the country while
running for re-election. According to MEPI and NDI officials, the head of
the Observatory decided to work for the president’s campaign without
discussing this move with other partner CSOs. Combined with the
government’s failure to recognize citizen observers, his decision proved
the death knell for a non-partisan observation mission, though the effort
was never formally abandoned. An abortive post-election effort by NDI to
transform the coalition into a government watchdog initiative never gained
traction.

*Question 2: Changing political environment*

While political changes in Algeria were limited with regard to the Arab
Spring, NDI did adapt its program to a major development in this period:
the institution of a one-third quota for women to hold seats in parliament
and local councils. By designing the program to work with women elected
officials, NDI took advantage of a new opening in a political system that
changes at a glacial pace.

NDI officials noted that they have worked in Algeria since the 1990s, and
established their Algiers office in 2002. They and MEPI officials said NDI
has built a level of trust with the government that allows it to operate as
one of the few international political development programs, and that it
has been able to react to political developments. Embassy officials said it
was a “heavy lift” for them to persuade the government to officially
register NDI in 2014.

The program also saw an opportunity in the kinds of legislation that MPs
addressed. In many countries, questions of social policy, women’s rights,
and welfare are sometimes stereotyped as “women’s issues.” While such
pigeonholing is discriminatory and should be resisted, it can mean that
there is some freedom of maneuver that does not exist in more sensitive
areas that may be viewed by an authoritarian government as directly
threatening its power.

In a similar vein, the attempt to organize domestic observation of the
election of the president, where true political power lies, proved more
threatening than the successful observation of the elections to the
relatively weak legislative branch. While NDI sought to build on that
success for the presidential election, the failure of the effort
demonstrated the limits on political freedom in Algeria. A January 2016 law
creating a national observation commission, with seats split between
government and civil society representatives, could provide an opening for
future support to election observation, if the regime is open to foreign
assistance to a body at the heart of national sovereignty. According to
U.S. Embassy Algiers, the head of the new commission was appointed in
October 2016, and appointment of other commissioners is expected by the end
of 2016.

Conclusions

The NDI program met its programming objectives. It was successful in
training women MPs and local officials to be more effective
representatives. The program was a particularly effective response to the
quota legislation that guaranteed a dramatic increase in women
representatives in the parliament elected in 2012.

The NDI program was also an effective way for MEPI to promote development
of democratically elected legislators without an institutional support
program to build the rudimentary capacities of a weak, understaffed
parliament. It made sense to target women MPs in the wake of the new quota
law for the 2012 elections, as they were a prime audience in need of
training. With the next elections scheduled for 2017, MEPI could build on
this success by aiming a follow-on program at all new MPs, regardless of
gender. Until parliament gains sufficient power to serve as a co-equal
branch of government, a dedicated legislative support program for the
institution is not indicated. One risk of member training, however, is that
the gains are lost if the member loses her re-election bid. The performance
of NDI trainees in the 2017 elections will provide an indication of how
long-lasting the results of this component will be.

The component to bring together CSOs and elected representatives showed
some success, particularly with regard to the legislative achievements. The
program did not establish a formal partnership between civil society and
government, but it did use experienced civil society leaders as trainers
for women elected officials. The attempt to create a domestic election
observation coalition failed due to government opposition to the idea and a
decision by the leader of the non-partisan Observatory to join the
president’s campaign.

The experience of this program provides some insights into the pace and
nature of political reform in Algeria. The regime appears willing to permit
democratic elections and governance in areas that do not threaten its power
or core interests. As a result, elections to a weak parliament are
permitted to be free, while the presidential election is controlled.
Parliament is permitted to modify social legislation that has minimal
effect on the finances or security of the state. Local officials are free
to address issues of everyday life.

In addition to allowing the national parliament and local councils to
operate freely, the regime has permitted political pluralism at the party
level. While NDI’s political party program is not funded by MEPI, it is an
important complement to work with elected officials and CSOs, and MEPI
would benefit from continued coordination between the two components and
donors.

The 2019 presidential election will provide evidence of the regime’s
willingness to allow free political competition, as the country is likely
to get a new president to replace the ailing Bouteflika. While election
observation could be an important assist to developing Algerian democracy,
a threatened regime could ban such an effort. Closely watching developments
over the next three years and acting flexibly could provide an opening for
successful MEPI programming.

------------------------------

[1] BBC, “Arab Uprising: Country by Country – Algeria,” Dec. 16, 2013.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482297

[2] See for example: Moshin Khan and Karim Mezran, *No Arab Spring for
Algeria*, Atlantic Council, May 2014; and Kamel Daoud, “The Algerian
Exception,” *The New York Times, *May 30, 2015.

[3] See for example: Yahia, H. Zoubir, “Algeria after the Arab Spring:
Algiers Came out Ahead – but the Good Times Could Be Over,” *Foreign
Affairs*, February 2016