Subject: Statement by NDI Pre-election Mission to Georgia
From: "Ken Wollack" <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 10:09:28 -0400

I hope you are surviving the dog days of July.

I thought you would be interested, particularly  Board and Ambassador
Circle members, who traveled to Tbilisi last month, in the comprehensive
statement by an NDI international delegation on the upcoming local
elections in Georgia. The statement below was issued at a press conference
in Tbilisi on Friday.

With best regards,

Ken

Kenneth Wollack
President
National Democratic Institute
455 Massachusetts Ave., NW, 8th Floor
Washington, DC 20001
202-728-5500 (Tel)
888-875-2887 (Fax)
email: [email-masked]
website: www.ndi.org

                                     *STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTE*

*PRE-ELECTION DELEGATION TO GEORGIA*

*Tbilisi, Georgia, July 21, 2017*

This statement is offered by an international delegation organized by the
National Democratic Institute (NDI). The delegation’s purpose was to
accurately and impartially assess electoral preparations in advance of the
October local elections; review the broader political environment; examine
factors that could affect the integrity of the electoral process; and offer
any recommendations that could advance dialogue and consensus-building
toward peaceful, credible elections and public confidence in the process.
In August, NDI will deploy a team of long-term observers. This will be
supplemented by an international election day observation delegation.

Members of the delegation include Catherine Noone, Deputy Leader of the
Irish Senate and Spokesperson on children and youth affairs; David Kramer,
former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
at the U.S. Department of State; Janusz Onyszkiewicz, former Minister of
Defense and Member of Parliament in the Polish Sejm;  Laura Thornton, NDI
Senior Resident Country Director in Georgia; Marija Babic, independent
electoral expert; Melissa Muscio, NDI Program Director for Georgia, Turkey,
and Central Asia; and Michael McNulty, NDI Senior Program Manager for
Elections. The delegation conducted its activities in accordance with the
laws of Georgia and the *Declaration of Principles for International
Election Observation*.[1]

From July 17 - 21, the delegation held meetings in Tbilisi with prospective
candidates, political parties participating in the elections from across
the political spectrum; members of the Central Election Commission (CEC),
the State Audit Office (SAO), and the Inter-Agency Commission on Free and
Fair Elections (IACFF); the president; the prime minister; the National
Association of Local Authorities; representatives of  the Regional Policy
and Self-Government Committee; representatives of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs; civil society organizations, including citizen election observer
groups; members of parliament; media representatives; and representatives
of the international and diplomatic communities. The delegation is deeply
grateful to all those with whom it met and who shared their views
generously. The delegation also expresses its appreciation to the National
Endowment for Democracy and the United States Agency for International
Development for supporting this mission.

NDI does not seek to interfere in Georgia’s election process and recognizes
that, ultimately, it will be the people of Georgia who will determine the
credibility of their elections and the country’s democratic development.
The delegation therefore offers this pre-election statement in the spirit
of supporting and strengthening democratic institutions and processes in
Georgia.

*SUMMARY*

Georgians have many achievements to their credit. The country stands out in
a difficult neighborhood. Georgia’s success in eliminating petty corruption
is held up as an international model. The country has signed an Association
Agreement with the European Union (EU) and has achieved a liberalized visa
regime with its Western neighbors. These steps have broad public support
among Georgians and are an indication of the successful reforms achieved to
date.[2] Pluralism is an established feature of the political and civic
landscape, and fundamental freedoms of expression, assembly, and
association are largely respected. Civil society organizations play an
active role in political life. The country has committed to the Open
Government Partnership and assumes the role of lead chair this year.
Competitive multiparty elections are now routine. Voters have a variety of
political choices, and citizens trust the electoral process.[3] They deemed
last year’s parliamentary elections as safe, orderly, and without
intimidation, and international election observers assessed them as
credible. Critically, Georgian citizens overwhelmingly support a democratic
future for their country. These polls will provide an opportunity for
Georgia to continue its positive track record in holding credible elections.

As the country prepares for local elections while simultaneously
undertaking controversial constitutional, electoral, and local government
reform processes, two parallel Georgias have emerged. One, seen through the
lens of ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party, is characterized by very few
democratic challenges: a media environment free from political pressure;
swift and unbiased adjudication of electoral and political cases; robust
and pluralistic political competition; and reforms that provide no
political benefit to GD. The other, held by nearly all other interlocutors
with whom the delegation met, represents a stark contrast to this vision:
it is characterized by uneven application of the law; an unbalanced
electoral playing field; reforms designed to benefit the ruling party;
shrinking media space for alternative viewpoints; informal governance; and
abuse of state resources. The diverging assessments of the political
environment and self-isolation of the ruling party call for more meaningful
and inclusive consultations and deliberation. Neglecting to do so could
impede the country’s democratic credentials and lead to instability.

Georgians have high standards for their leaders and institutions and will
expect a credible electoral process. In support of their ambitions and the
broader democratic process, NDI’s delegation noted several key challenges
and opportunities in upcoming the electoral process. The election
administration enjoys confidence among most interlocutors, although some
areas for improvement remain. Three controversial reform processes are
being conducted very close to election day and lack sufficient transparency
and inclusiveness. Abuse of state resources, an entrenched and longstanding
problem in Georgia, remains a widespread concern. Media faces the challenge
of providing the public with reliable information about their electoral
choices, while the space for pluralistic political discussion appears to be
shrinking. Hate speech and disinformation have begun to stoke hostility in
the electoral environment.

Coming at a critical juncture in Georgia’s democratic path, the October
2017 local elections, the exact date of which has not been set, carry
particular weight. They provide an opportunity for Georgia to address
remaining, entrenched electoral challenges. Because Georgia rightfully
takes pride in its democratic and European trajectory, the need to fully
address repeated recommendations from the past is all the more striking and
significant. The country has the skills, time, support, experience, and
resources to adopt many of these recommendations. What is still needed is
sufficient political will.

*POLITICAL CONTEXT*

Georgia approaches the October local government elections equipped with a
deep reserve of democratic assets. Georgians have many achievements to
their credit, including a vibrant political landscape, and overwhelmingly
support a democratic future for their country.

Heading into the country’s local government elections, however, this
delegation encountered two parallel and divergent Georgias: one seen
through the lens of ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party leaders and officials
and one described by all other groups with whom the delegation met --
domestic and international NGOs and observers, all other parliamentary and
non-parliamentary parties and candidates, the president’s office, and media
organizations. In the view of the former group, there are very few
democratic challenges. There are limited threats to media freedom and
access, adjudication of electoral and political cases is swift and
unbiased, there are few obstacles to equitable political competition, and
reforms -- whether constitutional or legal -- have taken into account input
and are pursued with the aim of improving democratic practices.

From the perspective of nearly all other interlocutors, however, there are
significant democratic challenges. There is often uneven and political
application of the law and resolution of disputes, an unlevel playing field
for parties and candidates, pressure on potential funding sources, legal
and constitutional reforms designed to politically benefit the ruling
party, shrinking media space for alternative viewpoints, and abuses of
state resources, including interference by the state security services.
Some of these issues certainly pre date the current government and have
characterized the political environment for over a decade. Further, they
allege that power and decision-making authority do not lie with the elected
leaders but rather there is informal governance from behind the scenes.

Such a stark disparity of viewpoints could erode public confidence and
contribute to instability over time. Regardless of the veracity of either
vision, with a large majority and concentration of power comes the
responsibility to earn public confidence, ensure equal opportunity and
rights for alternative voices, and build consensus across political lines.
At the same time, democracy depends on an opposition that constructively
engages in the political process and that can present a concrete and
positive alternative vision for the country.

Local elections matter. Local government is the first point of contact
between citizens and government, and local officials oversee the issues of
greatest immediate relevance to people -- including roads, kindergartens,
garbage collection, and environment. When local governance delivers,
democracies are bolstered and become more resilient. The Georgian 2017
elections are a critical opportunity for candidates and parties to
prioritize local issues of importance to many voters, who are frustrated
with unmet expectations on the issues that matter most to them.[4] These
elections have national political significance as well. The Tbilisi mayoral
race is not just about local governance. The capital city’s mayor is viewed
as a prominent position within Georgian politics, and the outcome of this
race between ruling government, opposition, and independent candidates
could well impact the power balance of the country. Across Georgia, these
elections will serve as a testing ground for the country’s political
forces, providing an opportunity for opposition political parties to
demonstrate their political relevance. The outcome will also determine
whether GD’s concentration of political power is further solidified.

*DELEGATION FINDINGS*

*Constitutional and Legal Reforms *

With just three months remaining before the October 2017 local elections,
Georgia’s constitution, election code, and local government legislation are
all in the midst of significant reform processes. These reforms, if passed,
would have several direct and indirect effects on the local elections. NGOs
and opposition parties have criticized all three reform processes as
lacking sufficient transparency and inclusiveness. Concerns have also been
raised about the timing of these reforms so close to election day.[5] Together,
these issues could impact trust in the electoral process.

It is also a significant missed opportunity that these constitutional and
legal reforms did not include measures to increase gender equity. Only 15
percent of parliamentary seats are held by women and 12 percent of local
councilors are women. Only one of the elected 71 mayors and *gamgebelis *(local
executives) is a woman. Groups such as the Gender Task Force have advocated
strongly for electoral reforms to promote gender equity in Georgia’s
politics. While voluntary financial incentives for gender representation on
parliamentary and *sakrebulo* party lists were enacted in 2011, this has
not been sufficient to overcome the significant barriers facing women in
politics.

*Constitutional Reforms*

In the wake of the 2016 parliamentary elections, the parliamentary majority
initiated a constitutional reform process.[6] Although the constitutional
reforms do not directly impact the 2017 local elections, the process has
been controversial and, according to nearly all interlocutors with whom the
delegation met, has significantly impacted the political environment
leading up to local elections. The process initially involved inclusive
debate through the state constitutional commission. However, all political
parties, except GD, and NGOs dropped out of the process when, as they
describe it, many of their key concerns were not taken into account. In
addition, the president refused to join the commission from the outset.
While majority party leaders claim that 80 percent of recommendations were
incorporated into the draft, few other stakeholders agree with this
assessment, and point out that the issues of greatest concern are where
their recommendations were not considered.[7]

Constitutional reform could provide an opportunity for generating
consensus. Instead, the current draft has become a polarizing document,
with GD on one side and all opposition parties and NGOs involved in
constitutional reform on the other. A constitution that lacks the support
of all opposition parties, the president, many prominent NGOs, and -- at
least in the case of some provisions -- the public[8] would diminish the
prospects for a political system that earns the public confidence.

*Local Government Reform*

Georgian local self-government currently consists of 12 self-governing
cities and 59 self-governing communities. Each self-governing unit has a
*sakrebulo* (local council) and a locally-elected executive. In June 2017,
four months prior to the local elections, the government introduced
amendments to local government legislation that, among other changes, would
merge seven of the 12 self-governing cities with their surrounding
communities. These reforms have a significant impact on the local
elections. If they become law, voters would elect 64 *sakrebulos *(reduced
from 71), as well as mayors of the five self-governing cities (reduced from
12) and the 59 self-governing communities. *Sakrebulos* are split between
proportional party-list seats and single-mandate majoritarian seats. There
remains a significant inequality of the vote among majoritarian
*sakrebulo* districts.
Overall, majoritarian districts in cities have less voting power compared
to majoritarian districts in their surrounding communities. The reforms
have been passed in parliament, and on July 20, the president vetoed the
legislation. The parliament could override the veto, as the ruling party
has a constitutional majority.

According to independent observers, as well as opposition parties, the
process by which the reforms were drafted was rushed, lacked transparency,
and was not sufficiently inclusive. Approximately 150 civil society
organizations signed a letter calling on the government to uphold the
self-governing cities. They were concerned that proposed reforms would
widen the gap between the local citizens and their elected officials in
those cities. In addition, nine NGOs have filed an appeal requesting the
court to annul the decision of parliament, claiming that mandatory public
consultations were not conducted. These NGOs, along with nearly all
“qualified” parties[9], were advocating to the president to veto the
reforms. The timing of the reforms, just months before the local elections,
is of significant concern. The reason for the urgency in passing the
current reforms was not sufficiently explained to the delegation. Even
elected officials deeply involved in the development of this legislation
acknowledged that a more strategic, well-researched, and systematic
approach to local self-government reform is needed to ensure equality of
vote and fair and effective allocation of funds, which the government has
indicated to the delegation it plans to substantially increase.

During the delegation’s meetings, several concerns were raised by NGOs,
parties, and local government representatives about the detrimental impact
the reform package would have on the seven self-governing cities that would
be merged with their surrounding communities. First, the cities’ control
over their own budget and local-level decisions would be diminished.
Second, six of the seven cities would have significantly less voting power
in their *sakrebulo* majoritarian constituencies compared to that of their
surrounding communities. For example, Zugdidi city, with approximately
50,000 registered voters, would have five majoritarian seats in the
*sakrebulo*, while the surrounding Zugdidi community, with approximately
70,000 registered voters, would have 30 majoritarian seats. This provides
majoritarian districts in Zugdidi community with more than four times the
voting power as those in Zugdidi city.[10] MPs involved in this legislation
did not deny the vote inequality, and NGOs and opposition parties pointed
out that this change was directed at the ruling party’s slipping support in
these cities. Third, parties, prospective candidates, and voters in these
cities and communities still do not have clarity as to what their electoral
system will be for the October elections.

*Electoral Code Reforms*

The parliament also recently passed two sets of amendments to Georgia’s
election code, which have now been vetoed by the president. These
amendments were passed just a few months prior to election day without
inclusive consultations. While positively assessing proposed changes which
would allow candidates outside Tbilisi to run for both mayoral and
*sakrebulo *seats,  NGOs and opposition parties evaluated several aspects
of the reforms as a step backwards. One of the most concerning reforms
relates to the composition of election commissions, which, as citizen
observer groups noted, would significantly narrow the parties eligible for
election commission seats and tilt the composition further in favor of the
majority party.[11] The election code also changes the manner in which the
CEC Chairperson is elected, which, NGOs note, would favor the majority
party compared to the current method.[12]

Several of the amendments would be applied to the 2017 elections if
enacted. Some changes, such as extending the time for unregistered voters
to obtain registration, could help enfranchise additional voters. However,
several interlocutors expressed concern that precinct election commission
(PEC) chairs would be granted the authority to remove anyone accused of
interfering in the process from the polling station and to fine them. They
noted that this discretion could be abused.

*Election Administration*

Since the election date has not been officially announced, the CEC has not
yet acquired many of its competencies and has not yet formally initiated
electoral preparations. Nevertheless, the CEC reported receiving adequate
resources, actively reviewing previous recommendations and devising ways to
address them within its mandate. In addition to its ongoing educational
programs, extensive trainings with the police, political parties, and
especially election officials have been foreseen and many of the previous
efforts to increase the inclusiveness, transparency, and effectiveness of
the process will continue. Special attention will be placed on further
enabling the participation of persons with disabilities. The CEC also noted
the importance of securing its electoral data from potential cyber attacks.

Most interlocutors with whom the delegation met generally view the election
administration as professional, impartial, and competent, while
highlighting some areas for improvement. Besides issues related to the
announced legal changes, concerns remain about the absence of formal
criteria used by the district election commissions (DECs) in selecting the
professional PEC members, who are meant to be nonpartisan. Representatives
of opposition parties and civil society organizations reported that in
previous elections in some districts there was not an open election among
all nominated candidates and that some professional PEC members had recent
party roles, leading to perceptions that these PECs were dominated by the
ruling party. Accurate counting and reconciliations of protocols is another
area of concern, with the majority of interlocutors acknowledging the need
for further PEC trainings and close monitoring of this important stage of
the process.

*Political Parties and Candidates*

Following the decisive victory of GD in the 2016 parliamentary elections,
the local balloting provides a renewed opportunity for parties to compete
for public support. Across the board, parties appear aware of citizens’
main concerns and have said their campaigns will address top priorities
like jobs, pensions, and other economic issues. Parties admit that they
would likely all be campaigning on similar issues and individual candidates
explained that they would distinguish themselves by their experience, their
specific knowledge of the issues, and track record of delivering on their
policy promises to citizens.

GD is confident of its popularity and while it anticipates being successful
in races across the country, it has set as its main priority the goal of
winning the Tbilisi mayoral election in the first round. At the same time,
opposition parties are regrouping and identifying new candidates and faces
who can join them as they seek to present a viable alternatives to GD.
Former government coalition members, such as the Free Democrats and the
Republicans, want to indicate their viability after having failed to secure
enough votes to cross the threshold into parliament. Meanwhile, the split
in the formerly largest opposition party United National Movement (UNM)
sets up two parties -- UNM and European Georgia (EG) -- to compete for
oppositional votes while simultaneously competing against the ruling party.
Additionally, the Alliance of Patriots of Georgia (AoP), which narrowly
gained seats in the parliament, will seek to demonstrate its relevance at
the local level. The outcome of these elections could determine whether the
ruling party becomes more dominant.

At this early stage in the process, parties are still determining their
candidate lists and developing platforms. The only evident campaign
preparation is centered on the Tbilisi mayoral race, primed to be the most
competitive race in the country. Several *sakrebulo* races are also likely
to draw intense competition, although little information is currently
available about parties’ nominations or strategies outside of Tbilisi. The
majority of parties intend to compete across the country, although some
smaller parties said that their decisions about which races to enter may be
limited by their financial and human resources.

In the 2014 local elections, parties nominated women for only 5 percent of
mayoral and gamgebeli candidates; 33 percent of proportional list
*sakrebulo* candidates; and 15 percent of majoritarian *sakrebulo*
candidates.[13] Improving upon these statistics in 2017 was not a primary
concern for most parties. Parties describe the many skilled women who
volunteer for them at both local and national levels. Consistently, party
leaders did not acknowledge internal barriers or their own responsibility
for actively promoting women but rather cited external factors beyond their
control that prevented greater women's participation. While mandatory
quotas remained unpopular among party leaders, most confirmed their
intention to set internal party quotas to include a minimum of 30 percent
women on their proportional lists.

*Campaign Finance*

The role of money in elections has remained a concern in Georgian politics
for more than a decade. In 2016, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(OSCE/ODIHR) and TI Georgia noted that there was a substantial imbalance in
the amount of funds that parties and independent candidates were able to
raise.[14] GD received 66 percent of all donations and outspent all other
parties and candidates combined.[15] Such an imbalance can diminish the
prospects for electoral competitiveness in these and future elections. With
the exception of GD, all political parties with which the delegation met
emphasized that it has become increasingly difficult to raise funds. They
report that even businesses and individuals who express interest in
supporting them (and those who have supported them in the past) are
reluctant to donate to them due to alleged threats of repercussions. As
such claims can be difficult to verify, this alleged pressure should be
monitored closely and documented by observers and party representatives.

NGOs and opposition parties also raised the need for increased transparency
regarding funding sources and amounts, as well as ensuring timely
adjudication of campaign finance violations. The State Audit Office (SAO)
oversees campaign finance. It can impose sanctions for violations of
campaign finance regulations. It can also acquire information on the
origins of funds and property donated, but only after receiving approval
from a court, which usually takes approximately a month to receive. For the
upcoming elections, the SAO plans to conduct trainings, produce video
instructions covering campaign finance regulations, and establish a
consultation center to ensure candidates’ awareness of their legal
obligations, as well as to cooperate with civil society organizations and
media to monitor compliance. While citizen observer groups generally view
the SAO as a well-managed government institution, stakeholders remain
concerned about the SAO’s ability and resources to exercise its oversight
role in an effective, transparent, and timely manner. The SAO reported
having limited human resources to investigate and oversee both income and
expenditures, especially with the high number of independent candidates
expected to contest the elections. Furthermore, the SAO reported difficulty
in tracking the funneling of donations through third parties and from
foreign sources.

*Abuse of State Resources*

Abuse of state resources is an entrenched and longstanding problem in
Georgia and has been used by successive governments to gain advantage.
Observer groups, including Transparency International (TI) Georgia,
International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), Georgian
Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA), NDI, the International Republican
Institute (IRI), and OSCE/ODIHR, have documented this problem and have
issued recommendations over multiple election cycles on ways to deter and
reduce such abuses.

Progress has been made in some aspects of the legal framework over the
years. However, parties and NGOs with which the delegation met noted that
the delay in formally announcing the election date postpones the
application of abuse of state resources regulations, potentially
advantaging incumbents. They also expressed widespread concern about four
main types of abuses that they believe may occur during the 2017 local
elections: (1) human resources, such as the longstanding practice of
mobilizing civil servants to attend government party campaign events and
pressuring them to vote for the government party; (2) physical resources,
such as the use of public buildings, vehicles, and equipment for campaign
purposes; (3) financial resources, such as increasing spending for local
infrastructure and social programs just prior to elections; and (4)
intimidation and harassment by state security services. Although difficult
to document and verify, nearly all interlocutors raised state security
service intimidation as a major problem in past elections, as well as a
concern ahead of the 2017 local elections. Allegations of past problems
include state security interference in the candidate selection and
nomination process, fundraising, campaign efforts, and voters' choices.

During the delegation’s visit, the Inter-Agency Commission on Free and Fair
Elections (IACFF), a temporary body established by July 1 of each electoral
year to respond to allegations of electoral violations by state officials,
held its first meeting. The IACFF works under the Ministry of Justice,
coordinates multi-stakeholder dialogue on electoral issues, and is
authorized to recommend action to government offices, law enforcement
authorities, public servants, and political parties. It announced plans to
reinforce previously issued instructions on abuse of administrative
resources and to ensure all public servants were well informed about the
regulations and sanctions for violations. Some interlocutors from parties
and NGOs acknowledge the IACFF’s role as a forum to voice concerns and
raise issues. They also express hope that there will be sufficient
political will to deter violations and ensure perpetrators are adequately
sanctioned.

*Media*

Georgia’s media environment remains one of the most free and diverse in the
former Soviet Union and repression against individual journalists is rare.
Freedom of expression is protected under the current constitution and there
are numerous national and regional media outlets. However, politicization
of the media shapes coverage and allegations of undue government influence
over station management and editorial choices have been a source of
concern, both of which could hamper citizens’ ability to make informed
political choices. The delegation heard repeatedly of the recent change in
management of the Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB), which is viewed by
most as partisan. Maestro and other smaller television stations have been
incorporated under Imedi TV, considered favorable toward the government in
its editorial   policy.[16] Rustavi 2, the most popular station in Georgia
and viewed as slanted toward the opposition, particularly UNM, is in a dire
financial and managerial situation as a result of controversial court
rulings suspending its borrowing ability and changing its ownership. Only
due to the intervention of the European Human Rights Court has the current
management been able to stay in place, for now.

The space for pluralistic political discussion also appears to be
shrinking, in part due to the managerial changes described above. Just
months before these elections, Maestro and the GPB both removed important
political programming and debates from their schedules; these had provided
much-needed air-time to smaller, non-parliamentary parties precisely when
these opportunities are needed most. For those political shows that have
continued, broadcasters report difficulties in securing commitments from
the ruling party to participate in on-air political discussions. Several
parties, particularly the smaller ones, as well as independent candidates,
claim that this shrinking space, combined with the bias within editorial
policies of TV broadcasters, makes it difficult for them to receive
equitable coverage, with some reporting that they receive no coverage.

Despite these challenges, as elections approach, most media stations
pledged to air some talk shows and debates that bring representatives from
all qualified (and in some cases, also non-qualified) subjects to present
their platforms and debate key issues. National broadcasters admit that
providing comprehensive coverage of local campaigns will be challenging.
With more than two thousand races across the country, it will be difficult
to provide consistent, in-depth analysis of local races and issues. The
role of cash-strapped regional media outlets, therefore, becomes all the
more important in ensuring that the public will have reliable information
about their electoral choices. Online networks are also a growing presence
and have the potential to provide a low-cost platform to reach the public,
although they will be limited in their reach.

*Hate Speech and Disinformation*

As local elections approach, xenophobic, ethno-nationalist, homophobic, and
ultra-conservative rhetoric has begun to emerge, stoking hostility in the
electoral environment. Just prior to the delegation’s arrival, on July 14,
more than 2000 protesters held a “March of the Georgians” anti-immigration
rally in downtown Tbilisi. A former deputy state minister under GD and a
current MP from the AoP participated, as reported by multiple media outlets.
[17] In addition to launching anti-LGBTQI slurs, the march organizers
demanded the deportation of illegal immigrants, the toughening of
immigration laws, restrictions on residence permits for foreigners, and a
ban on foreign funding to civil society organizations. These issues amplify
existing prejudices and populist sentiments that are also reflected in the
ruling party’s draft constitutional amendments, including defining marriage
as between a man and a woman and the prohibition of the sale of land to
foreigners.

NGO and opposition party representatives who spoke with the delegation
linked the march to a growing trend of disinformation and Russian
interference. Unsubstantiated accounts of rapes and other violent acts
committed by immigrants have been shared on social media, then picked up in
traditional Georgian-language media. According to the leader of the
movement *Nationalists *and one of the organizers of the Georgian March,
Sandro Bregadze, “the country should be wiped out of foreign criminals who
are maniacs, who rape children, commit various crimes, engage in
prostitution, and sell drugs.”[18] The prevailing disinformation tends to
frame the West as a threat to Georgian identity; the EU as a source of
migrants, terrorism, and as a demographic threat; and the Russian
Federation as a fellow Orthodox country serving as a counterweight to the
West.[19] NGOs with which the delegation met ascribed the origins of these
messages to Russia, saying they are intended to erode trust in facts and
truth, and to fracture, discredit, and ultimately undermine confidence in
democratic values and norms. A young woman who publicly criticized the
march on Facebook became the subject of intense harassment and threats of
sexual violence, illustrating the volatility of the environment.

While NGOs were extremely concerned about the impact of disinformation and
foreign interference and believe the severity of incidents will ratchet up
as elections approach, the level of alarm among political parties varied.
Most opposition parties that spoke with the delegation raised concerns
about what they view as growing ethno-nationalism and Russian involvement.
Members of the government and GD party largely dismissed allegations that
misinformation or anti-Western propaganda is a significant problem in
Georgia. They maintain that citizens are not susceptible to these messages.

*Unequal Application of the Law*

Concerns were repeatedly raised by political parties and NGOs regarding
what they believe to be a lack of adherence to rule of law, particularly
regarding acts of violence and legal charges from both the 2016 electoral
period as well as in recent months. They pointed to a pattern of delayed
investigations, selective pursuit of cases, pressure on judges, and uneven
and disproportionate application of sanctions. For example, alleged
political interference and obstruction of justice surrounding judicial
rulings on the Rustavi 2 ownership dispute were the basis upon which the
European Court of Human Rights suspended the decision.

During the delegation’s meetings, opposition parties and NGOs repeatedly
expressed concern about the delayed timing and alleged lack of will to hold
perpetrators accountable for high-profile cases prior to the 2016
elections. Examples included the violence that occurred against leading
opposition figures in Kortskheli 14 months ago and the bombing of
opposition MP Givi Targamadze’s car just days before the 2016 polls. They
also raised the May 2017 accusation by the Auditor General that the former
Chief Prosecutor physically assaulted him. He claimed it was a reprisal
against the State Audit Office’s investigation of alleged corruption by the
former Chief Prosecutor. An investigation was launched into the incident,
but still no charges have been filed nor justice served. Perpetrators of
past incidents of intimidation and defamation of women candidates have also
not been brought to justice. Merely launching an investigation or
initiating court proceedings without timely resolution is not sufficient to
reassure the public or deter future violations. Until perpetrators are
quickly brought to justice, a culture of impunity remains and confidence in
due process is undermined.

*RECOMMENDATIONS*

The delegation notes that its visit occurred prior to the official start of
the election period. With this in mind, the delegation respectfully offers
the following recommendations on steps that can be taken between now and
the elections to enhance confidence in the October 2017 polls and the
electoral process more broadly. NDI’s international election observation
mission will monitor these recommendations and will issue additional
statements at key points in the process. The delegation notes that many
recommendations from previous elections have not yet been adequately
addressed and expresses its sincere hopes that they will be heeded before
October 2017.

*Political Parties*

●       Agree on a common code of conduct for the electoral campaign that
emphasizes commitment to nonviolence. Party leaders should adopt internal
awareness raising and accountability measures, and should continue to
communicate to all activists and candidates their expectations for
compliance with the code, levying sanctions for members found to have
violated it.

●       Acknowledge and identify internal obstacles to women’s
participation within parties. Parties should consider changing internal
behaviors and practices, including working hours and decision-making
processes, in order to attract women candidates. Parties should also honor
their verbal commitments to ensure a minimum of 30 percent women candidates
on *sakrebulo* party lists in these elections.

●       Present concrete policies that take into account the mandate of
local self-government bodies and describe plans for delivering on promises
to citizens. This requires participating in media debates and political
talk shows, particularly for the ruling party, which declined participation
in multiple debates in 2016.

*Parliament*

●       Reconsider the local government reform package. Take time to
incorporate a more systematic, long-term approach in the announced
decentralization strategy in consultation with local government
associations, NGOs, and other stakeholders. Allocation of majoritarian
sakrebulo seats should be reconsidered to ensure the principle of equality
of the vote.

●       Refrain from introducing significant changes to election-related
legislation less than a year ahead of an election.

*Government Bodies*

●       Law enforcement bodies should respond to and investigate
allegations of intimidation and violence in a timely, effective, and
transparent manner.

●       The IACFF and other government bodies should undertake a visible,
concerted effort to communicate to all civil servants and the public that
abuse of administrative resources will not be tolerated, and that violators
will swiftly be held accountable.

●       Explore ways to increase the human resources of the SAO to ensure
adequate and comprehensive analysis of political finances and provide
timely information to the public.

●       Relevant ministries should develop concrete strategies to mitigate
against disinformation, taking into account the EU resolution to counteract
(anti-EU) propaganda.

●       Consider ways to regulate the spread of disinformation, for example
by working with civil society and media on developing a clear criteria
defining disinformation and  fact-checking coordination mechanisms.

*Election Administration
                       *

●       Consider clarifying the qualifications and selection procedures for
professional PEC members, including standards for impartiality.

●       Dedicate special attention to training PEC members on counting and
reconciliation procedures.

●       In order to build on achievements to date on inclusion of ethnic
minorities in the election process, consider making essential information
on the CEC website available in Armenian and Azeri. This would allow
speakers of those languages to more easily navigate to relevant electoral
information and services.

*Media*

●       To increase voter access to information on contestants,
broadcasters should grant nonqualified subjects a minimum amount of free
airtime to convey their messages.

●       The public broadcaster should ensure that announced
election-related programs and talk shows provide equitable access and
balanced coverage of electoral contestants and their platforms.

*Judiciary and Law Enforcement*

●       Prosecutors and judges should ensure impartial, timely application
of justice to the cases of violence during the 2016 elections, as well as
recent political violence -- looking broadly to all individuals involved in
planning or aiding these crimes -- to help deter such violations in the
future.

*Civil Society focused on Media and Disinformation*

●       Monitor disinformation not only in mainstream media but also
smaller platforms.

●       Expand media literacy programs so that citizens develop skills of
verifying content and sources and avoid being consumers and disseminators
of disinformation.

*International Community*

●       Consider supporting local media outlets, which have become
increasingly reliant on funds from local government, to ensure voters have
access to in-depth coverage of local races and candidates.

●       Increase support for citizen election observer groups to ensure
issues such as abuse of state resources, campaign finance, violence, rule
of law, media, and disinformation campaigns are thoroughly monitored. This
is particularly important for the local elections, given the lower level of
international observer presence relative to national elections.

*NDI CONTACT INFORMATION*

Diana Chachua, [email-masked], [577 779639]

*The National Democratic Institute is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization
working to support and strengthen democratic institutions worldwide through
citizen participation, openness and accountability in government.*

*For more information about NDI, please visit our website, www.ndi.org
<http://www.ndi.org>.*

------------------------------

[1] The Declaration of Principles, launched in 2005 at the United Nations,
is available at www.ndi.org/DoP.

[2] NDI’s April 2017 public opinion poll
<https://www.ndi.org/publications/results-april-2017-public-opinion-polls-georgia>
shows
that public support for the European Union (EU) has risen to 80 percent
from 72 percent in November 2016.

[3] NDI’s November 2016 poll shows 96 percent of citizens evaluated the
elections as safe, 96 percent as well-ordered, and 93 percent as free from
intimidation.

[4] In NDI’s April 2017 public opinion poll
<https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI_April_2017_political%20Presentation_ENG_version%20final.pdf>,
38 percent of respondents said that “no party” is closest to them, which is
nine percent higher than any party. About an equal percentage of
respondents believe country is headed in wrong direction as the right
direction.

[5] The European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) Code
of Good Practice in Electoral Matters
<http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD(2002)023rev-e.aspx> states
that “the fundamental elements of electoral law... should not be open to
amendment less than one year before an election.”

[6] Following adjustments made after the June 19 Opinion
<http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD%282017%29013-e>
of
the Venice Commission, the latest reform package would: shift the
presidential election from a direct to an indirect system beginning in
2024; transition the parliamentary electoral system from mixed to fully
proportional in 2024; reduce the threshold to enter parliament from 5 to 3
percent for the 2020 elections only; award all of the undistributed
mandates -- up to a certain limit -- to the party that receives the most
votes; appoint Supreme Court justices to life-time terms; and define
marriage as a union exclusively between a man and woman. These amendments
passed with two readings at the end of June. The final hearing is scheduled
to take place in the fall of 2017.

[7] The parliamentary majority’s last-minute decision to postpone the shift
to the fully proportional electoral system until 2024, instead of 2020, has
been particularly criticized by opposition parties, civil society
organizations, and the Venice Commission. They also expressed concern that
the provision to allocate leftover mandates to the party with the most
votes and the indirect election of the president provide further advantages
to the ruling party.

[8] For example, NDI’s April 2017 public opinion poll
<https://www.ndi.org/publications/results-april-2017-public-opinion-polls-georgia>
show
that 84 percent believe that the president should be directly elected.

[9] Qualified parties are those who receive state funding, which is
determined based on elections, at least 3 percent in local or parliamentary
elections.

[10] The Venice Commission Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters
<http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD(2002)023rev-e.aspx>
Article
2.2(iv) notes that “The permissible departure from the norm should not be
more than 10 percent, and should certainly not exceed 15 percent except in
special circumstances (protection of a concentrated minority, sparsely
populated administrative entity).”

[11] The CEC, district election commissions, and precinct election
commissions would be reduced from 13 to 12 members, with six professional
and six party-nominated positions. Instead of the current system of
allocating one partisan seat to each qualifying party, the reform would
allocate partisan seats to parties based on the proportion of total votes
received by each party in the previous parliamentary elections. Only
parties that cross the 5 percent threshold and form a faction in parliament
would be eligible for election commission seats.

[12] Joint statement <http://www.isfed.ge/main/1245/eng/> by ISFED, GYLA
and TI Georgia, June 26, 2017.

[13] Based on gender statistics data
<http://cesko.ge/res/old/other/29/29150.pdf> from the CEC.

[14] TI Georgia Election Campaign Finance in Georgia: 2016 Parliamentary
Elections
<http://www.transparency.ge/en/post/report/election-campaign-finances-georgia-2016-parliamentary-elections>
.

[15] Based on data from the State Audit Office (SAO).

[16] NDI public opinion polls (2014) have shown that the public views Imedi
as more likely to “represent the interests of the GD,” while Rustavi 2
slants UNM.

[17] Netgazeti, Parliamentarian Emzar Kvitsiani joined the Georgian March,
<http://netgazeti.ge/news/207459/> July 14, 2017 and Rustavi 2, So Called
“Georgian March” and Attitudes of Foreign Businessmen Toward It
<http://rustavi2.ge/ka/news/80458>, July 16, 2017.

[18] EPN, Our Country Will be Wiped Out of Foreign Criminals - “Georgian
March” Will Be Held on July 14 <http://epn.ge/?id=48272>, June 30, 2017

[19] Media Development Foundation (MDF) Anti-Western Propaganda, 2016
<http://mdfgeorgia.ge/uploads/library/65/file/eng/Antidasavluri-ENG-web_(2).pdf>