Subject: [big campaign] How to Redeploy from Iraq in 8-10 months
From: "Allison Price" <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked]
Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2008 10:34:42 -0400
List-Id: <bigcampaign.googlegroups.com>

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/08/how_to_redeploy.html

* *

*How to Redeploy*
*

Implementing a Responsible Drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq
*

By *Lawrence J.
Korb*<http://www.americanprogress.org/experts/KorbLawrence.html>,
*Sean Duggan*<http://www.americanprogress.org/aboutus/staff/DugganSean.html>,
*Peter Juul* <http://www.americanprogress.org/aboutus/staff/JuulPeter.html>|
August 11, 2008

Some have asserted that a U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq will take two
years or more, but we believe it is not only possible, but necessary, to
conduct a safe and responsible redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq in no
more than 10 months. Our military can accomplish such a task, should it be
assigned, if it uses all elements of U.S. military power, focused on our
land forces' proficiencies in maneuver warfare and logistics.

There is significant disagreement and confusion about the time necessary to
withdraw all U.S. military forces from Iraq. Proponents of an indefinite
U.S. military presence in Iraq have asserted that a withdrawal of over
140,000 American troops and equipment would be fraught with risk,
uncertainty, and overwhelming logistical complications. According to a
recent ABC News piece, several commanders in Iraq stated that there was "no
way" a withdrawal of one to two brigades per month could work
logistically—although none of them agreed to be quoted on the record.

The debate over how to conduct an American withdrawal has gravitated back
and forth between those arguing that there must be either a rapid,
precipitous withdrawal, and those advocating for a long, drawn-out
redeployment. Many who argue for an extended redeployment over several years
do so simply in order to "stay the course" in Iraq, and cherry-pick
logistical issues to make the case for an extended U.S. presence.

Deciding between a swift or extended redeployment, however, is a false
choice. Both options are logistically feasible, but this report will
demonstrate that an orderly and safe withdrawal is best achieved over an 8
to 10 month period. This report, written in consultation with military
planners and logistics experts, is not intended to serve as a playbook for
our military planners; it is a guide to policymakers and the general public
about what is realistically achievable. A massive, yet safe and orderly
redeployment of U.S. forces, equipment, and support personnel is surely
daunting—but it is well within the exceptional logistical capabilities of
the U.S. military.

It is necessary now more than ever for the United States to commit to a
responsible phased withdrawal. This must be done because, as many analysts
have noted, the American invasion and occupation of Iraq has produced
several unintended consequences. A large and indefinite military presence in
Iraq has allowed Al Qaeda and the Taliban to reconstitute itself, diverted
U.S. attention from the war in Afghanistan, weakened the United States'
ability to project its hard and soft power around the world, and
strengthened Iranian influence throughout the greater Middle East.

The latest unintended consequence is widespread Iraqi opposition to the
seemingly indefinite American troop presence. The Bush administration's
positions on the bilateral Status of Forces and Strategic Framework
Agreements has created a broad Iraqi political consensus in favor of a U.S.
commitment to withdraw its forces from the country.

Recent calls from Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, his cabinet, and the
majority of the Iraqi Parliament for a specific timetable for the withdrawal
of American forces from Iraq represents the beginning of a broad
cross-sectarian parliamentary bloc that could provide the organizing
principles for accommodation in the short term and eventual reconciliation.
No such consensus yet exists among Iraqis as to what the new Iraq will be,
but broad consensus does exist around the belief that no genuine,
sustainable Iraqi unity can develop while the Iraqi government continues to
be underwritten by a large foreign military presence.

Despite Maliki's many statements supporting a timetable for a U.S. troop
withdrawal, many supporters of remaining in Iraq mistakenly argue that
Maliki is just pandering to his constituents. Many of these same people
thought we would be greeted as liberators when we invaded and occupied Iraq,
ignoring the fact that resistance to foreigners is an integral part of
Iraq's national identity and that it is the Iraqis, not the United States,
that will determine their fate.

The United States must therefore move beyond a discussion about the effect
of the surge, and seize this opportunity offered by the Iraqis to take
control of their own security by beginning a responsible phased withdrawal
of U.S. combat troops from Iraq. Such a withdrawal gives the United States
the best opportunity to achieve its goals in Iraq and advance overall U.S.
security interests in the greater Middle East.

Iraqi leaders are increasingly eager and able to take over their own
affairs. Unlike during the Iraqi elections in 2005, scores of Sunni
political parties are preparing to run in the provincial elections
originally scheduled for this fall, and Iraqi Security Forces have taken the
lead in several operations from Mosul to Basra. Lt. Gen. James Dubik, the
American officer currently in charge of training Iraq's security forces,
told Congress last month that the Iraqi Army and police will be ready to
assume responsibility for Iraq's internal security as early as April 2009.

Those opposed to a timetable for withdrawal make the argument that setting
such a timetable will undermine the gains made by the surge of 30,000
American troops into Iraq in the first half of 2007. According to Gen. David
Petraeus, the situation in Iraq is too volatile to project a withdrawal
date. In fact, Petraeus has it exactly backward. It is not listening to the
Iraqi government that will endanger the gains we have made in the last year.

There can be no doubt that violence has reached its lowest levels since
2004, but supporters of maintaining an indefinite American troop presence in
Iraq attribute the current reduction in violence solely to the simple
increase in American combat forces and ignore other factors that have
contributed to today's improved security environment. These other factors
were either directly linked to the prospect of an American withdrawal or had
nothing to do with the surge in the first place. Not setting a date will
actually undermine these gains.

The recent decline in violence in Iraq from the record levels of 2006 and
early 2007 is due in large part to the emergence of Sunni "awakening" groups
and Sons of Iraq militias. These groups were co-opted by U.S. forces in the
early fall of 2006, long before the surge even began, and were in part a
response to the widespread belief by Sunni's in Anbar that the United States
would not be remaining in Iraq indefinitely.

According to commanders on the ground, the prospect of a U.S. withdrawal was
the main impetus for Sunni cooperation. Major General John Allen, a Marine
Commander in Anbar, has stated that the rising pro-withdrawal sentiment in
the United States, which was reflected in the victory in the 2006 midterm
election of pro-withdrawal candidates, had a major effect on the Sunnis.
According to Allen, the election "did not go unnoticed....They talked about
it all the time." He went on to say that the Marines in Anbar, "from top to
bottom, reinforced the message sent by the [2006 election results] by
saying, 'We are leaving.... We don't know when we are leaving, but we don't
have much time, so you [the Anbaris] better get after this.'"

Brigadier Gen. Sean McFarland, who had been a colonel in command of the
Army's First Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division in Al Anbar province
from January 2006 until January 2007, credited the "growing concern that the
U.S. would leave Iraq and leave the Sunnis defenseless against Al-Qaeda and
Iranian-supported militias [which] made these younger [Sunni] leaders open
to our overtures" as the main reason for the turn around in Al Anbar.

In other words, the Sunni Awakening forces began cooperating with U.S.
forces in late 2006 because they believed we were leaving. The perception
that we will maintain a large presence in Iraq indefinitely will endanger
this cooperation.

The unilateral standdown of Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr and his Mahdi Army,
which began in February 2007, was also key to reducing violence. This
development, like the co-option of the "Sons of Iraq" militias, was not a
result of the U.S. troop build-up, nor was it instigated by the Iraqi
government. It had much more to do with Sadr positioning himself for the
upcoming election.

While Sadr's power and influence have been weakened over the past year, his
political movement still remains popular among many Shiites, and the cleric
still possesses a military wing, the Jaish al-Mahdi, which is capable of
causing problems for the government of Prime Minister Maliki and his
supporters in Parliament—the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Dawa
Party. Absent a timetable for withdrawal, this struggle for power can become
violent again.

Surge proponents point to the marked drop in ethno-sectarian violence, in
particular, as a reason for maintaining the Bush administration's current
policy. Yet this decline in violence resulted as much from the completion of
ethnic and sectarian cleansing and the near homogenization of Baghdad
neighborhoods as from the U.S. troop build-up.

The surge proponents' final claim, that recent troop reductions are what
President Bush calls "a return on success," is also misguided. The surge of
combat troops ended not because of conditions on the ground, but because the
Pentagon could not maintain 20 brigades in Iraq and keep the current level
of forces in Afghanistan without extending the tours of the surge brigades
by more than 15 months.

But debating how much the escalation of 30,000 troops was responsible for
the current levels of violence in Iraq is beside the point. The real issue
is where do we go from here.

The reduction in violence has produced a tenuous security balance in Iraq,
but it has not yet resulted in the kind of sustainable equilibrium that
locks in the security and political gains that have been made in the
country. Absent an incentive to truly take over their own affairs, the Iraqi
government has not made satisfactory progress toward national
reconciliation, nor have they implemented critical power or revenue sharing
laws.

In fact, a continued large-scale U.S. presence in Iraq has allowed Iraq's
warring factions to stall on making the tough choices that they would have
to make if faced with a timetable for U.S. withdrawal. Provincial elections,
originally scheduled for October 2008, are a case in point, as they are not
likely to take place this year.

The United States can truly take advantage of what security gains have been
made over the last 18 months by using a withdrawal timetable as a lever to
force political change in Iraq, while pushing Iraq's competing powers to
recalculate their self-interest in light of a U.S. withdrawal. By putting
the Iraqi government and its neighbors on notice that they—not the United
States—will be responsible for the consequences of any instability in Iraq,
the United States will give all players involved an incentive to begin
acting constructively in Iraq.

President Bush and his supporters, undeterred, continue to reject setting a
timetable for withdrawal. The White House justified a recent agreement that
sets a vaguely worded "general time horizon for withdrawal," by asserting
that the "success" of the surge necessitates an indefinite large-scale U.S.
presence in Iraq. This is the wrong course.

In order to solidify recent security gains and bring about meaningful
reconciliation, the United States must move beyond the surge and begin a
withdrawal of all American troops as soon as possible from Iraq. This is
what the majority of the American people and the Iraqi people want.

Withdrawal will not only improve the chances of stabilizing the region; it
will allow the United States to reset its entire Middle East policy. Over
the past seven years, U.S. influence throughout the greater Middle East has
diminished to such a degree that we are no longer liked, feared, or
respected.

*Read the full report*<http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/08/pdf/how_to_redeploy.pdf>(pdf)

*Video: How to Redeploy*<http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/08/redeploy_video.html>

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